T n the 1980s and 1990s, the Germ an tele com m unications industry was character ized by stable industrial relations institutions and high levels of worker participation in management decisions. The union and works councils at the form er m onopolist Deutsche Telekom (DT) played a central role in guiding increm ental adjustm ent to new technologies and m ore competitive markets (Darbishire 1997 ). DT's resulting "labor-m ediated" re structuring strategies m aintained high wages, stable jobs, and worker skills at a time when similar firms in the U nited States and United Kingdom were pursuing "m arket-m ediated" strategies that involved forced layoffs and deskilling (Batt and Darbishire 1997; Katz 1997) .
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Developments since the late 1990s have led to m ore radical changes in the Germ an telecom m unications market. New regula tions in 1998 ended DT's m onopolies in all m arket segments, encouraging the expansion of low-cost service providers with weaker, or no, collective agreem ents. DT m anagem ent has come under increased pressure to maxi mize shareholder value, at the same time that it faces declining m arket share and growing price-based com petition. The shift to m ore liberalized m arkets, shareholder-oriented corporate governance arrangem ents, and non-union com petition represents growing convergence on the conditions that incum bent providers in liberal m arket countries like the U nited States faced in the 1990s. At the same time, other institutions have proven m ore resilient. Germany continues to have broad co-determ ination rights and a 4 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW "dual" apprendceship system that prom otes em ployer investm ent in vocational training, while union mem bership density and support have rem ained high at DT.
In this paper, I ask how, and to what extent, these distinctive institutions have influenced the recent restructuring measures adopted by large G erm an telecom m unications firms. The findings of this study contribute to con tem porary debates on the extent and nature of recent changes in Germ any's "coordinat ing" institutions (for example, Bosch and W einkopf 2008; Kitschelt and Streeck 2004; Streeck 2009; Thelen and van W ijnbergen 2003) . Based on studies of Germ an m anu facturing workplaces in the 1980s, Streeck (1991) and T urner (1991) , am ong others, argued that sectoral bargaining with strong unions, workplace-level co-determ ination, and vocational training em phasizing polyva lent skills constituted productive constraints on firms that prom oted social peace while enhancing corporate perform ance. The m ore recent literature on national varieties of capitalism emphasizes com plem entarities between these institutions and Germ any's stakeholder-oriented corporate governance arrangem ents, which are argued to support com petitive advantage in quality-focused m arkets (Hall and Soskice 2001) .
A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that broad trends of internation alization and liberalization of markets are underm ining these advantages and weaken ing traditional constraints on m anagem ent. G erm an firms are under pressure to increase short-term returns, in response to the grow ing proportion of individual shareholders and shareholder activism by international institutional investors (H opner2003). Union density and bargaining coverage have de clined across sectors, employers associations are losing members, and concessionary plantlevel bargaining has increased (Doellgast and Greer 2007:57-58) . These developm ents raise two questions. First, how (if at all) do national and workplace-level industrial relations institutions in Germany continue to influence firm s' strategic choices under conditions of m arket liberalization and de clining union power? Second, to what extent, and in what ways, have these institutions been transform ed by the erosion of traditional sup ports for workplace-level bargaining?
Using telecommunications as a case study, I exam ine the process of change in G erm any's coordinating institutions at the industry level, as well as the effects of m ore stable bargain ing structures and bargaining rights at the workplace level, in a setting where this change has been dram atic in recent years. Findings are based on over 150 interviews with union and works council representatives, managers, and employees conducted between 2003 and 2007, as well as company docum ents and industry reports.
Market Liberalization and Industry Restructuring
Deutsche Telekom (DT) was a publicly owned company in the 1980s and 1990s, retaining its m onopolies in long distance and local phone services as well as in the growing mobile, Internet, and cable markets. Deregulation and privatization initially oc curred through a drawn-out series of legisla tive reforms. Post Reform I went into effect in 1989 and separated the postal service, the post bank, and telecom m unications services. Mobile and satellite com m unications were opened to limited com petition, but DT m ain tained its m onopoly in network services. In 1993, the European Council passed a directive calling for m em ber states to eliminate m o nopolies on network infrastructure and voice telephony services by 1998. The G erm an governm ent responded with Post Reform II in 1995, which laid the groundwork for the privatization of telecom m unications and postal services. The DBP-controlled postal service, post bank, and telecom m unications services were converted to private corpora tions, and Deutsche Telekom AG was estab lished as a joint-stock company with 100% state ownership.
Despite these changes, as of the mid-1990s DT still controlled around 90% of the data services m arket and 90-95% of the cable network. DT also benefited from "asym m etrical" regulation that gave it a num ber of advantages, with low incentive price regula tion and few limitations on cross-subsidization or m arket entry (Darbishire 1997:195-96 (Schroder 2007) .
Despite these changes, the Germ an tele com m unications m arket continues to be influenced by its past developm ent trajectory. DT was able to m aintain m arket power and a diversified corporate structure, which have allowed it to rem ain the dom inant provider in core segments and in the growing multi m edia services m arket. It has been accused of using judicial review to delay or block unfavorable regulatory decisions and lever aging its m arket power to delay provision of leased lines and to introduce artificially low "dum ping prices" in certain markets, such as DSL (OECD 2004:59-60) . More recently, DT lobbied Germ any's coalition governm ent to exem pt new investments in its high-speed fiber-optic network, VDSL, from regulation. In 2006, the Bundesnetzagentur, backed by the EU, required DT to offer local loop unbundling on the network. However, in February 2007 a new clause in the Germ an Telecomm unications Act came into effect that exem pted new markets from regula tion, allowing DT to prevent com petitors from gaining full access to most of its fiber optic network for a fixed period. The EU Commission instituted breach-of-contract proceedings, arguing that these provisions conflict with the EU's legal framework. At the time of writing, this conflict had not yet been resolved.
DT's role in developing Germ any's tele communications infrastructure also has given it a sustained competitive advantage in high speed internet services. The company did not invest in a com peting cable network for voice and internet, instead prom oting DSL services and expansion of its high-speed inte grated services digital network (ISDN). DT was forced to sell majority stakes in its nine regional cable com panies in 2000, following the Cable Directive. However, DT tem porar ily retained a "25% plus one vote" share in each of these companies, which gave it veto rights over m ajor restructuring decisions. In 6 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW addition, the direct custom er connections continue to be owned and operated by a large num ber of small private companies, which has m ade it both com plex and expensive for the large cable operators to invest in upgrading their infrastructure. As a result, the cable network has not becom e a major com peting source of broadband services, as it has in the U nited States and the United Kingdom.3
Finally, the Germ an telecom m unications m arket has been relatively stable com pared to that of other countries. DT suffered from a plum m eting share price and revenue losses until 2003, when it finally m anaged to turn a profit. Rapid growth after liberalization gave way to consolidation and tighter margins in the early 2000s. However, these growing pains were relatively m inor com pared to the accounting scandals, overbuilding of capacity, and plum m eting share price that U.S. telecom m unications firms experienced at the end of the 1990s. Despite a shift to a stronger "shareholder value" orientation, stakeholder-based corporate governance traditions have given banks and employee representatives additional oversight over company finances and investm ent decisions (Borsch 2007 ).
DT's continued m arket power and regula tory influence have protected the company to some extent and allowed it to m aintain a dom inant m arket position in most seg ments. At the same time, it is increasingly disadvantaged by its high-cost structure, large fixed infrastructure investments, and new regulations that seek to curb its m arket power. While other firms can "cherry-pick," choosing to concentrate on high-value-added m arket segments, DT has an obligation to provide universal service. The company has a num ber of social obligations that cre ate additional costs, including its continued em ploym ent of Beamten, or civil servants, share in local telephone services has fallen by over 30% since 1998 (See Figure l) .7 DT's mobile subsidiary T-Mobile controls around 38% of the wireless custom er base (See Table 1 ). DT also controls around 50% of the growing internet m arket, where it competes with fixed-network and internet service providers such as Arcor, Freenet, Versatel, and H ansenet (See Table 2 ).8 In the past few years, DT has faced a m ore rapid hem orrhaging of customers, whose num bers declined by 1.5 million in 2006, and shrink ing net profits, which dropped close to 60% in the first quarter of 2007. 
Effects o f Restructuring on Industrial Relations
These recent developm ents in the Ger man telecom m unications m arket have had wide-ranging effects on collective bargaining institutions, both at DT and in the industry as a whole. The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) operated as a single-company enter prise union in the Deutsche Bundespost and then at DT, and enjoyed considerable influ ence over strategic decision-making through the union-dom inated personnel councils and representation on the com pany's advisory board. In the 1990s, the DPG continued to enjoy close relationships with managers and works councilors. M ember density in core areas of the business rem ained high, at around 70-80%. Close to 50% of the form er Bundespost's employees were civil servants, and thus enjoyed lifetime job security along with other special em ploym ent rights.
In 2001, the DPG m erged with four other service unions to form the conglom erate 8 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW union ver.di, with most staff moving to the new u n io n 's telecom m unications and IT division Fachbereich 9 (FB9). Union m em ber ship rem ained high in traditional areas of the business, and union and works council representation on the company's supervisory board gave ver.di continued influence over corporate strategy.
However, ver.di has been less successful in growing industry segments. Because DT was a monopoly, collective bargaining was tradi tionally organized at the enterprise level, with no employers association or industry-level agreem ent. The union attem pted to establish sectoral bargaining following liberalization, but it was unable to do so for several reasons. First, the DPG, and then ver.di, continued to be viewed as the union of Deutsche Telekom. Local exchange carriers and com peting net work operators were unwilling to cooperate with the form er m onopolist or its union, which placed a priority on protecting DT's m arket position; and the employees of these firms were wary of joining a union that represented DT employees' interests. DT's com petitors form ed the Association of Tele com m unications and Value-Added Service Providers (VATM) , but m em bership remains voluntary and the association has not sought to engage in collective bargaining.
Second, the DPG faced com petition from other unions as it sought to organize new workplaces. As firms in the public, metalwork ing, chemical, and energy sectors diversified into telecommunications and IT, their unions negotiated agreem ents with these new busi ness units. Today ver.di's only agreem ents outside of DT are with cable providers for merly owned by DT, such as Kabel Deutsch land, and with city carriers like NetCologne that had agreem ents with the form er public sector union otv (See Table 3 ).
Restructuring exacerbated the com peti tion am ong unions, particularly between the metalworking union IG Metall and the new conglomerate service union ver.di. Those two unions both negotiated separate agreem ents with different operating subsidiaries of the DT group's company T-Systems, which was form ed when DT's telecom m unications and IT service division m erged with Debis System haus, a service division of the autom aker DaimlerChrysler. DT's m ajor fixed network competitor, Arcor, was form ed through the m ergers of subsidiaries that had separate agreem ents with IG Metall, Transnet, and IG BCE. In 2000, the unions formally divided responsibility for new telecom m unications and IT companies. However, this has not prevented conflict at a time of declining m em bership and changing firm boundaries. For example, ver.di had agreed that the m et alworking firm M annesm ann's mobile phone subsidiary D2 M annesm ann Mobilfunk fell under IG Metall'sjurisdiction, but changed its position after the British telecommunications company Vodafone took over M annesm ann. Thesejurisdictional conflicts have prevented the unions from developing a coordinated strategy at the industry level and divided works councils at the company level.
A third challenge to establishing sectoral bargaining has been the persistence of low union density in new industry segments. Most small service re-sellers and internet service providers have not negotiated union agreem ents. Larger com petitors were estab lished either by international firms that did not have a prior relationship with G erm an unions or by diversified G erm an firms that were reluctant to negotiate new agreem ents for their telecom m unications subsidiaries. D2 M annesm an M obilfunk began negotia tions with IG Me tall in the mid-1990s, but did not conclude a collective agreem ent until 2001, after the company was taken over by Vodafone. M em bership has rem ained low, at around 5%, and in some regions works councilors have broken off all ties with the union. Employees at the wireless provider E-plus elected works councils in the late 1990s with ver.di's assistance, but as of 2009 union m em bership still rem ained low, union affilia tion of the works councilors was fragm ented, and there had been no progress toward an agreem ent.
These three factors-distrust by new em ployers of DT's close relationship with the DPG, com petition between unions, and low union m embership in new segments-help to explain the continued lack of a sectoral agree ment. More surprisingly, the DPG also has not negotiated a com m on framework agreem ent for the com panies in DT's corporate group, where the union continues to have a strong and institutionalized bargaining relation ship with m anagem ent. As DT transitioned from a fixed network carrier to a diversified corporate group in the 1990s, the company established independent subsidiaries for dif ferent m arket and service segments. In 2000, DT shifted to a new divisional structure, based on its four m arket "pillars" of T-Com (fixed network), T-Mobile (wireless), T-Systems (business and IT ), and T-Online (internet ser vices) . T-Com rem ained an internal division of the parent company, Deutsche Telekom AG, and thus rem ained under the com pany's original collective agreem ent. However, the DPG concluded separate agreem ents with T-Mobile and T-Systems and was unsuccess ful in securing an agreem ent with T-Online.
Negotiations between ver.di and T-Online ended in 2005 when DT announced that it would bring the subsidiary back into the par ent company to take advantage of synergies between internet and network services, re branding T-Com as "T-Home." At the same time, the group within T-Com servicing small and medium-sized com panies m erged with T-System's large business customers group to create a new business custom er division. DT has also established a num ber of subsidiaries that perform cross-divisional m anagem ent functions or operating activities, and these are either covered by the parent company agreem ent (often with unique terms) or by separate agreem ents. Ver.di representatives estimated in 2007 that there were over 100 col lective agreem ents across Deutsche Telekom.
This fragm entation of collective bargain ing within DT can be partially explained by the broader developm ents in the telecom m unications industry discussed above. Ver. di m em bership and works council ties have rem ained weaker in business units competing in newer m arket segments: union density is around 70-80% in the parent company, but is estimated to be 10-20% at T-Mobile and T-Systems, and was close to 5% at T-Online before it was re-integrated into the parent company.
Sako and Jackson (2006:356-58) provide two additional explanations that are specific to DT. First, the union m erger that form ed ver.di drained resources and diverted atten tion from newer DT operations, ham pering m em bership recruitm ent and allowing works councils in these operations to assume a more central and independent role. Second, pay and working conditions in the new business units were initially better than those at the parent company, as DT sought to encourage employees to accept transfers as well as to at tract new employees with technical skills that were in high dem and. Works councils and employees in the subsidiaries thus had both the means and the incentive to m aintain a structure of separate agreements. A further explanation for DT's fragm ented collective agreem ents is its unique history of enterprise unionism . Because the DPG negotiated with only one employer, it had established a tradition of form al collective bargaining on a num ber of topics that are typically included in works agreem ents in other sectors, such as scheduling practices and variable com pensation. As m anage m ent sought to differentiate these practices, union representatives preferred to negotiate separate agreem ents rather than shift respon sibility to works councils through opening clauses. This tradition was a source of labor strength in the 1970s and 1980s, based on an unusually close relationship between the works councils and a single-employer union. However, as DT has decentralized its own corporate structure, the form erly close rela tionships between works councils in different areas of the business have broken down. U nion and works council representatives are nowjointly responsible for adm inistering increasingly com plex collective agreem ents. The corporate group's works council plays a relatively weak role, dealing primarily with decisions that affect the entire group, while company-level works councils have prim ary responsibility for negotiating agreem ents on such m atters as work design, job security, and com pensation practices that are not covered in agreem ents with ver.di. As a result, ver.di has found it increasingly difficult to coordi nate bargaining and participate in strategic decision-making at the corporate group level.
Figures for m em bership density and bar gaining coverage in the G erm an telecom m u nications industry are not publicly available, and thus can only be roughly estimated. In 2006, ver.di representatives claimed to have 70% density in Deutsche Telekom 's broadband/fixed network operations and head quarters (with around 115,000 employees), an average of 40% in DT's other subsidiaries (45,000 em ployees), and 5% in new industry entrants (56,000 employees).9 Union density 9DT reported a total of 159,992 employees in its Ger man operations, of whom 86,315 were in Broadband/ Fixed Network (T-Com/T-Home) and 28,188 in Headquarters/Shared Services-leaving 45,489 employees was thus at most 47% in 2006, falling from an estimated 57% in the mid-1990s (Funk 2004) . Coverage of employees by firm-level collective agreem ents is still high, due to DT's continued high share of industry employ ment. Based on similarly rough calculations, it appears to have fallen from close to 100% to around 85% .10 However, these figures do not take into account the large and growing proportion of custom er service, sales, and technician jobs perform ed by third-party sub contractors, which have lower union density and are typically not covered by collective agreem ents-a trend that is discussed in greater detail below.
In the absence of sectoral bargaining, works councils have assumed central respon sibility for negotiating collective agreem ents in many new workplaces. However, works councils have not built strong relationships with the union outside of DT's fixed network business. Works councilors at different loca tions in large firms often do not know each other due to frequent restructuring, and m embership in company-level works councils changes often as divisions are spun off and as form er com petitors m erge. are struggling to develop new approaches to regulating working conditions in a more competitive sector, without the institutional m oorings of a sectoral bargaining structure or a com m on framework agreem ent at DT.
Employment Systems
Growing fragm entation in industrial rela tions and m ore differentiated markets pro vide greater scope for m anagers to exercise strategic choice as they seek to reorganize work and im plem ent new perform ance m an agem ent systems. As markets reach satura tion, both DT and its competitors increasingly seek to attract and retain customers, which creates incentives to invest in service qual ity. At the same time, growing price-based com petition and declining profit margins introduce potentially conflicting pressures to reduce labor costs. New technologies increase the complexity of many jobs, but also facilitate rationalization, routing of calls to rem ote locations, and individual perfor m ance m onitoring.
The following section focuses on the em ploym ent practices that Germ an employers adopted as they sought to respond to these con tradictory pressures and incentives, drawing on case study data from Deutsche Telekom 's two largest business units, T-Com (fixed network) and T-Mobile (wireless), and from two of its m ajor com petitors, Arcor (fixed network) and Vodafone Germ any (wireless)-both of which are owned by the British m ultinational Vodafone. Case studies were conducted in two major areas of tele com m unications employment: technicians and custom er service and sales workers, with a particular focus on call centers.
Technicians. Technicians are responsible for constructing and m aintaining networks, both for private customers and for large busi nesses, as well as installing and repairing lines and services. H ere I focus on technicians at T-Com and Arcor, where these jobs represent a m ajor occupational group (in contrast to the mobile companies, which employ a smaller num ber of specialized technicians). DT owns most of Germ any's infrastructure (83% of telephone channels in 2006), which is then leased or resold by competitors; and its technicians are responsible for m aintain ing and servicing both this fixed network and a large proportion of Germ any's wire less network. Even where com petitors own their own network, DT typically services the "last m ile," or the connection between the distribution point and the customer. This means that the majority of telecom m unica tions technicians are employed by DT-for example, while DT's service regions typically employ over 1,000 technicians, similar Arcor regions employ less than 100.
At T-Com, there were four main job catego ries: Monteur handled simple connections and product assembly; Service Monteur and Service Technikerwere responsible for m ainte nance and repair; and Service TechnikerSpezial built and m aintained large business networks. Almost all of these employees had com pleted apprenticeship training in the Systemelektroniker/in trade, and most received their training at DT. Arcor had a similar division between its System Spezialistin, Professional System Spezialistin, and Senior System Spezialistin. The majority of technicians were trained in the m ore unusual occupation of Facharbeiter fu r Nachrichtentechnik due to the com pany's prior ownership by the Deutsche Bahn. T-Com continued to offer apprenticeship places in technician trades, and made a com m itm ent in its collective agreem ent with ver.di to hire a proportion of these apprentices into perm anent positions every year (currently around 80). In contrast, Arcor did not offer apprenticeship places, instead hiring techni cians who received training elsewhere. The content of jobs also differed: DT technicians typically perform ed a wider variety of tasks associated with servicing custom er connec tions, while Arcor technicians were primarily responsible for large business customers and network m aintenance.
Work organization in both com panies changed over the 1990s, due to new tech nologies that facilitated the tracking and distribution of jobs. Previously supervisors would m eet with employees each m orning to distribute assignments; today, technicians primarily work alone, and alljob assignments are allocated over the internet through per sonal laptops. At T-Com, employees m et with "virtual team s" of 17 to 20 technicians at least once a m onth to discuss team goals and to receive training on new products. M anagem ent introduced team competitions, but these were optional and did not affect bo nuses until recently (which will be discussed below). Employees also had working time accounts and flexible working hours, allowing them to start up to half an hour early and to work up to 10 hours per day. Additional hours were accum ulated in their accounts, and technicians negotiated individual plans with team leaders for "drawing down" these accounts by the end of the year through reduced hours. All of these changes were negotiated with strong works councils, which resisted the introduction of pay-at-risk, pro tected employees from electronic m onitor ing, and ensured that individual technicians m aintained broad control over their working time arrangem ents. T-Com's technicians thus traditionally enjoyed considerable autonomy, with few substantive consequences or incen tives attached to m eeting perform ance goals.
At Arcor, work was organized similarly, but with less use of teams: technicians typically worked alone and most com m unication oc curred between individual employees and their regional dispatcher, who allocated jobs, approved individual schedules, and planned training. Working time accounts allowed technicians to accumulate only 10 "plus" or "m inus" hours, and employees had less individual control over use of accounts. In addition, Arcor technicians had a larger com ponent of variable pay based exclusively on individual bonuses. Once a year, a supervi sor evaluated perform ance in several areas, and employees received a bonus paym ent based on "points" received, am ounting to, on average, 5% to 10% of total pay. While work was m ore individualized than at T-Com, Arcor technicians also enjoyed high levels of autonom y and relative status within the company. U nion and works council agree m ents provided extensive protections; for example, individuals were able to contest bonus evaluations, and there were strong negotiated limits on m onitoring.
Customer service and sales. Service and sales jobs-primarily in retail stores and call centers-have becom e m ore im portant as a strategic channel for attracting and retaining customers. These jobs are expanding at all telecommunications companies, but make up a larger proportion of em ploym ent at DT's major com petitors than at DT, particularly among service resellers, which do not m ain tain their own infrastructure.
Formal vocational training continues to be im portant for recruitm ent and prom otion in service and sales jobs, although this varies across firms. DT offered an apprenticeship in retail sales, or Kaufleute im Einzelhandel, in its retail subsidiary T-Punkt, which represented 16% of its total apprentice places in 2006. While other firms offered this training, they did so at a lower rate, and typically adjusted the num ber of new apprentice places based on their recruitm ent needs. Call center agents at DT traditionally com pleted the apprenticeship training Kaufleute fur Biirokommunikation (M anagem ent Assistant in Office Com m unications), which was not specific to call centers, thus offering mobility to other jobs in the company and sector. Its com petitors and call center subcontractors, in contrast, recruited employees from a variety of backgrounds, with a heavy reliance on students; and many did not fund appren ticeship training. In 2006, a new call center apprenticeship, Kaufleute fu r Dialogmarketing, was negotiated between ver.di, the DGB, and the em ployers' organization Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaftfur Berufsbildung (KWB), with the cooperation of several large call center vendors. According to union repre sentatives, close to 90% of training for the new apprenticeship takes place in the firm, making it less costly than other apprentice ship courses that involve m ore extensive classroom training. Employers have argued that the new apprenticeship will help to raise the status of call center work and improve skill portability. However, union and works coun cil representatives at DT felt it represented a devaluing of the broad skills provided in the previous apprenticeship, and would serve to further segregate call center agents and reduce mobility within DT.
Call centers have also been a central focus of work reorganization measures. New tech nologies have m ade it easier to route calls between rem ote locations and to subcontrac tors, match agent availability with fluctuating call volume, and m onitor agent perform ance. These jobs represent a large proportion of employment, averaging around 30% of jobs in the largest companies, and thus provide an obvious target for reducing labor costs. Although the com panies studied here-TCom, T-Mobile, Arcor, and Vodafone-have adopted different practices, all four moved toward a similar em ploym ent system in the early 2000s that relied on worker skill and discretion.
First, all four com panies increased the complexity of call center jobs. In 1999, T-Com retrained agents to handle a range of billing, sales, complaints, telemarketing, and service calls. T-Mobile also gradually re duced specializations, although it m aintained dedicated groups for high-and low-value custom er segments. Arcor and Vodafone had m ore specializations, but pay and working conditions were not differentiated based on call type and mobility across jobs was high. These changes were associated with low wage spread within each com pany's internal call centers and allowed managers to distribute calls m ore flexibly between locations and agent groups.
Second, all of the com panies adopted scheduling arrangem ents that provided m an agers with m ore flexibility to adjust employ m ent levels to daily and seasonal fluctuations in call volume, while giving workers some control over their working time. T-Com and T-Mobile negotiated working time accounts with their works councils in the early 2000s, which allowed employees to build up hours in their accounts when call volume was high, and then draw down those hours when they needed extra time off. Employee control over these arrangem ents was strongest at T-Com: works agreem ents specified that team lead ers could not force agents to work overtime or prevent agents from leaving when they chose if they had sufficient "plus" hours. As a result, team leaders relied on m aintaining a good relationship with their team to avoid staffing problems. Arcor and Vodafone did not have working time accounts, but this was in part due to works councils' percep tion that m anagers would take advantage of these arrangem ents. At Arcor, the works council had gradually improved scheduling predictability and helped individual workers to secure favorable shifts based on needs such as child care, while Vodafone employees were able to refuse requests by m anagers to change their shifts.
Third, new perform ance m anagem ent practices relied on developm ental forms of motivation through coaching and training rather than discipline and dismissals. Works councils placed strict, negotiated limits on individual m onitoring and incentives. These limits were strongest at T-Com and T-Mobile, where works agreem ents prohibited m anag ers from recording individual perform ance metrics, disciplining individual workers based on their perform ance, or basing variable pay on individual sales goals. At Arcor, works agreem ents also prohibited individual m oni toring, with the exception of call length; and "mystery calls" evaluating service quality were reported only at the team level. Vodafone allowed mystery calls to be reported at the agent level, but individual results were only available to several "trainers" at each center who could only use these data to give employ ees feedback and coaching. Coaching was described by m anagers and works councilors as a negotiation rather than evaluation, as team leaders had restricted ability to threaten poor perform ers with hard consequences, such as dismissal.
F ou rth, all four com panies ad o p ted team-based work organization and incen tives-encouraged in large part by these negotiated limits on individual m onitoring. At T-Com and T-Mobile, evaluations of team perform ance determ ined the distribution of variable pay. At T-Com, this was overseen by a com m ittee at each workplace with an equal num ber of employee and employer representatives. In addition, sales goals for each team were incorporated into a collec tive agreem ent, and employees were able to appeal these goals before ajo in t committee. Teams at Arcor's call centers were responsible for providing "team reports" that identified group goals and suggestions for improving systems. Employees in each team were as signed a coaching role, and variable pay was distributed by team leaders as a bonus on top of base pay. At Vodafone, teams had weekly and m onthly sales goals, and m anag ers organized special team com petitions and bonuses. At all of the companies, there was a strong focus on building "team spirit," with regular team m eetings, workshops, and training sessions, as well as activities planned together outside of work.
These em ploym ent practices reinforced one another: limits on m onitoring, com bined with broad control by employees over their working time, m ade it difficult to pursue individualized, discipline-based strategies for motivating workers. Employees adopted a m ore professional attitude toward their jobs, encouraged by their broad autonom y and a strong "occupational identity" fostered by apprenticeship training in a sales or adm in istrative profession. Works councils played an im portant role in placing these negotiated limits on the possible range of m anagem ent practices, as well as ensuring some fairness in the im plem entation of new incentives such as variable pay.
Participatory practices were further sup ported by high and uniform wage levels and job security, secured through collective bargaining with ver.di at DT and IG Metall at Arcor and Vodafone. Union agreem ents were strongest at T-Com, with higher pay across call center jobs and jo b security pro visions. However, union agreem ents at the other com panies had also helped to reduce internal inequality and raise overall pay, collapsing often com plicated structures of individual contracts and varied pay grades that were the legacy of m ergers and spin-offs into a simpler structure with less variation. For example, Arcor was form ed by a series of m ergers between o.tel.o, germany.net, and a num ber of smaller city carriers. In 2003, IG Metall and Transnet finally concluded a col lective agreem ent for the com pany's new call center subsidiary that collapsed 16 different em ploym ent contracts from these m ergers into two contracts, while ensuring that no employees were assigned a lower pay grade.
Organizational Restructuring
The above com parison dem onstrates that worker representatives played an im portant role in encouraging large telecom m unica tions firms to invest in em ploym ent systems that relied on worker skills and involvement to improve productivity in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, in recent years, employers have adopted in parallel a set of externalization strategies that have under m ined many of these gains. O utsourcing and the creation of new subsidiaries are two increasingly popular organizational restruc turing m easures that involve shifting some portion of corework-or, alternatively, entire departm ents or establishm ents-to a new organization, thus entailing a renegotiation of em ploym ent contracts and collective bar gaining agreem ents. These organizational changes have led to increased variation in pay and working conditions and declining coordination between works councils across establishments.
Outsourcing. Large telecom m unications firms rely on third-party subcontractors to perform technician, retail, and call center work. DT traditionally used subcontractors to handle peaks in dem and for technicians, but increasingly uses them for regular work. For example, in Nordrhein-W estfalen, the com pany's largest adm inistrative region, DT employed 1,800 in-house technicians and 1,200 external technicians through its subcontractors in 2007. These subcontractors were used primarily to handle simple jobs, such as installation; were not used for large business accounts; and were m ore likely to be assigned to jobs ordered from com peti tors who resell services on DT's network. At Arcor, subcontractors employed around half of the technicians servicing the com pany's network. Again, these employees tended to perform m ore routine or lower-skilled jobs, but Arcor was using them for an increasing proportion of technician work in all areas.
The organization of retail establishments is more decentralized: large firms typically both own their own retail stores and rely on franchises or third-party chain stores to sell products and services. In 2007, DT owned 600 stores employing over 4,000 sales workers. These were moved to a subsidiary, "T-Punkt," in 2004, but the new company was covered by a collective agreem ent and primarily em ployed workers with apprenticeship training in retail sales. Employment was less regulated in the third-party stores that sold DT services, which were not covered by the DT agree m ent and tended to recruit m ore students or other employee groups that lacked formal qualifications. Vodafone Germany owned 240 of its own stores in 2007, but had over 1,000 franchises, or "partner stores," that employed close to 3,000 employees and were not covered by Vodafone's collective agree m ent with IG Metall.
A similar trend can be seen in call center operations. Several companies, including T-Online and the m obile provider E-plus, outsourced a majority or all of their call center work, and others outsourced peaks in call volume or certain lower-skilled jobs such as operator services. T-Com outsourced most of its directory assistance jobs in the late 1990s, and T-Mobile gradually increased the outsourcing of calls during late hours, peak times, vacations, night shifts, and outbound campaigns. By 2007, according to DT works councilors, around 7,000 of T-Com's call center jobs were perform ed by subcontrac tors. During this same time period, Arcor increased outsourcing of call volume peaks, late-night calls, outbound campaigns, and all directory assistance work. Union offi cials estimated that close to 90% of Arcor's "sim ple" or transactional call center jobs were perform ed externally, while managers retrained the internal work force to focus on m ore com plex technical service jobs and high-value-added custom er segments.
Works councils and union representatives initially cooperated with these measures, as they were viewed as a useful escape valve for pressures to reduce labor costs or extend service to unsocial working hours (Doellgast 2008) . For example, in 2000, Vodafone's works council agreed to allow m anagem ent to outsource peaks in call volume and some telem arketing campaigns in exchange for strong job security protections. However, out sourcing often created new and unexpected pressures. Vodafone began to outsource all new growth in call volume rather than expand em ploym ent in-house. In-house workers were benchm arked against subcontractors, increasing pressure on works councilors to im prove productivity and allow m ore individual perform ance m onitoring. Ver.di negotiated a special agreem ent in 2006 with T-Mobile that included pay at risk and reduced starting pay for new hires in call centers, following an em otional campaign in which m anagem ent threatened to outsource all custom er service jobs if the agreem ent was not accepted.
The growing use of subcontractors for form erly core telecom m unications jobs has moved thousands of these jobs to com panies that are typically not covered by union agree ments. Only one large call center subcontrac tor, Walter Services, negotiated an agreem ent with ver.di, and this was considerably weaker than those that covered the workers of its m ajor clients, including DT (Holst 2008) . While large subcontractors often have works councils, they tend to be newer, to have weaker relationships with unions, and to have little contact with the works councils of client companies. These com panies also typically pay lower wages, m onitor work m ore inten sively, dem and greater scheduling flexibility from their workers, and rely m ore heavily on commission and pay at risk.
Subsidiary creation. An alternative set of restructuring m easures involves moving in ternal departm ents or entire job categories to subsidiaries. Similar to outsourcing, this is an organizational change that allows firms to re-negotiate collective agreements. Subsid iary creation has not been a m ajor elem ent of restructuring at Arcor or Vodafone. W hen Arcor and o.tel.o m erged in the late 1990s, Arcor brought together their call centers into a new company, M annesm ann Custom er O p erations (MCO), and negotiated a separate agreem ent for these workers. However, the subsidiary was subsequently brought back within Arcor in 2003, at the same time that the company began downsizing em ploym ent due to increased use of subcontractors for call center jobs. Deutsche Telekom has been most aggressive in adopting this strategy for both fixed network and mobile opera tions-due in part to its size and strong job security agreem ents that limit other forms of externalization.
In March 2004, DT established two new subsidiaries, Vivento C ustom er Services (VCS) and Vivento Technical Services (VTS), to handle lower-skill call center and technical support work across DT, as well as to provide subcontracted services to external clients. These new businesses were form ed due to DT's unique em ploym ent com m itm ents. Between 1995 and 2004, Deutsche Telekom cut 110,000 positions in its core operations, largely through early retirem ent, voluntary buy-outs, and natural turnover. R edundant employees who could not be accom m odated through these m easures were moved into Vivento Personal Service A gentur (PSA), a "tem porary em ploym ent and qualification com pany" or Beschaftigungsgesellschaftc reated in 2002 that was intended to place employees in short-term assignments within and outside of DT. By 2003, Vivento PSA had grown to close to 20,000 employees, whom DT was ob ligated to m aintain at their form er pay level.
VCS and VTS were established to target new m arkets using this surplus work force, and over 4,000 employees were moved to the two subsidiaries from Vivento PSA. U nder the 2004 collective agreem ent, the new sub sidiaries rem ained under the DT agreem ent, although pay was reduced to 91.25% of em ployees' form er salaries. While employees transferred from other DT com panies were able to keep their employment contracts, new employees were hired under less favorable terms. For example, the starting m onthly salary at VTS was 1,900 Euros in 2006 com pared to 2,300 Euros for T-Com's in-house technicians. By 2007, DT was contracting a portion of its "outsourced" call center and technical service work to VCS and VTS.
Ver.di representatives were initially opti mistic that the Vivento companies would allow DT to in-source thousands ofjobs perform ed by vendors. However, m anagem ent soon m ade it clear that it intended to sell the new subsidiaries. The sale of the Vivento establishments dem onstrated m anagem ent's increased will ingness to outsource technician and service jobs. However, in contrast to DT's form er outsourcing strategies, these measures shifted formerly core workers (and ver.di members) to firms with weaker or no collective agree ments. This presented a new set of challenges for ver.di's telecom m unications departm ent, FB9, as it sought to support its mem bers who were transferred to call center vendors. Call center employees transferred to Arvato (owned by the notoriously anti-union con glomerate Bertelsm ann) had the terms of their existing collective agreem ent secured through 2009, and m anagers have indicated that they will ask employees to sign individual contracts at a lower level when the agreem ent expires. Union and works council representa tives were inform ed that pay would average €25,000 a year, with m ore than a third of that am ount paid directly by Deutsche Telekom; however, this "top-up" is secured only for five years. In addition, working time will be increased to 40 hours from 38, and other form er perks, such as vacation time, will be cut. Ver.di is encouraging employees not to sign the new contracts, and instead seeking to pressure Arvato m anagem ent to negotiate a collective agreem ent, using leverage from its members in the form er VCS locations where m em bership density remains at around 40 %. Predictably, it is facing steep resistance from m anagem ent, which has informally threat ened to move work to other locations (with weaker union support) if employees refuse to sign individual contracts.
Ver.di faces a different set of challenges at the VCS locations that were transferred to Walter Telem edien. Walter was the only major call center vendor to negotiate a col lective agreem ent with ver.di, but the price for this was a "com petitive" wage rate for the industry: the agreem ent set minim um hourly pay at €5.11, with an additional perform ancebased com ponent of €1-2. W hen Walter purchased the new locations from DT, the employees were automatically transferred to this existing agreem ent, based on a provision in Germ an law that provides an exception to transfer of undertakings rules when both firms are covered by agreem ents with the same union.11 W alter's agreem ent had been negotiated and adm inistered by a different departm ent within ver.di, FBI 3-against the resistance of ver.di representatives in the telecom m unications departm ent FB9. This m eant that employees who had formerly earned an average annual salary of €33,000 saw their pay cut by around a third. W alter's collective agreem ent expired at the end of 2007, at which time ver.di sought a new agreem ent at its preferred m inim um wage of €7.50. However, Walter refused to consider an agreem ent at this level, arguing that doing so would put it at a disadvantage in competing for clients with non-union subcontractors.
Further conflicts were sparked by DT's announcem ent in 2007 that it planned to shift 50,000 of its technical service, technical infrastructure, and call center jobs to three new subsidiaries (to be called "T-Service"), coupled with the dem and that ver.di renego tiate pay and working conditions. Ver.di led a six-week strike-the first in the history of the company-with strong support from its m em bership. Despite this show of strength, the union faced a num ber of challenges in building bargaining power in negotiations. Ver.di's m em bers initially sought to use their position on the DT Aufsichtsrat to oppose the creation of the subsidiaries, but were unsuccessful. Once m anagem ent decided to go ahead with the planned restructur ing measures, the union was unable to use a strike to oppose these measures under Germ an law; it could legally strike only to protest the consequences of such measures for employees. In addition, managers planned to move employees from both T-Mobile and T-Com into the subsidiaries, which they ar gued gave them the legal right to adopt the less favorable T-Mobile agreem ent without further negotiation (particularly for the new call center subsidiary). Finally, DT publicly threatened to sell the service subsidiaries if it was unable to get a favorable agreem ent. This put ver.di in a weak, and largely defen sive, bargaining position.
U nder the agreem ent eventually reached by both parties, wage levels for form er T-Com employees moved to T-Service were reduced by 6.5% over 42 m onths, and weekly working time increased from 34 to 38 hours without pay com pensation, am ounting to an overall reduction in com pensation of m ore than 10%. In addition, new employees were to earn 30% below the form er level; the use of variable pay increased, with 15% of base pay tied to DT's organizational perform ance and individual and team perform ance targets; and the regular working week was lengthened to include Saturdays in call center operations. M anagem ent agreed to extend protection against com pulsory layoffs until 2012, to refrain from selling the new service subsid iaries until 2010, and to offer 4,150 jobs at T-Service to DT apprentices.
M anagem ent also used the restructuring process as an opportunity to renegotiate works agreem ents on a range of topics. For example, DT was introducing GPS tracking systems and began to discuss with its works councils the possibility of using this technol ogy to m onitor the movements of individual technicians, resulting in a limited pilot proj ect. Because the agreem ent introduced pay at risk tied to perform ance, m anagem ent sought and secured limited exceptions to works agreem ents that allowed supervisors to look at individual perform ance metrics. Worker representatives also faced difficult ne gotiations over w hether the time technicians spent driving to their first assignm ent and hom e from their last assignm ent would be in cluded in employees' official working hours. Both parties eventually resolved this with a compromise agreem ent allowing employees some limited use of company-owned vehicles as com pensation for lost pay. These changes represented a substantial reorganization of work, characterized by a shift to individual incentives and increased m onitoring.
In addition, works councils accustom ed to their distinct company "cultures" were obligated to develop a new structure for decision-making and com m unication. Call center jobs from both T-Com and T-Mobile were moved into the new subsidiary; and while T-Com's works councils were organized on a regional basis and dom inated by ver.di m embers, T-Mobile's works councils had a workplace-based structure and weaker links to ver.di. Works councilors anticipated that the integration process would generate con flicts in the short term and divert resources from negotiations over substantial planned changes in work organization. After a year within the new structure, local works councils were struggling to m aintain autonom y as m anagem ent sought increasingly to by-pass the local level and negotiate agreem ents with the central works councils for each new company.
Summary. The outsourcing and subsidiary strategies discussed above further eroded al ready weak coordinated bargaining structures and contributed to increased labor m arket segm entation and downward pressure on wages within large firms. Pay level and struc ture for technician jobs were similar between DT and Arcor, following the reductions in base pay and introduction of variable pay at DT: at T-Service, technicians in the lowest m ajor pay grade started at €26,000, with an average salary of around €35,000, and top salaries close to €50,000 for senior special ists. At Arcor, the lowest pay grade started at €25,000, with an average salary of around €33,000, and a maximum of €43,000 for senior specialists.12 Table 4 compares pay levels for call centers in Deutsche Telekom 's subsidiaries and m ajor vendors. This illus trates the large variation between in-house and outsourced firms perform ing largely similar work, as well as the extent of potential pay reduction for DT's call center workers as they are shifted from T-Com to the subsidiar ies T-Service and Vivento.
Conclusions
The liberalization of the Germ an telecom 12Pay rates based on collective agreements as of 2007. munications m arket in the 1990s precipitated a num ber of changes in industrial relations institutions and m anagem ent strategies. The industry today is characterized by increasingly fragm ented collective bargaining structures, declining union bargaining power, and grow ing variation in pay and working conditions within and across firms. These developments are particularly striking when m easured against the industry's recent history. Up to the mid-1990s, the industrial relations system was characterized by encom pass ing bargaining structures, strong internal bargaining coordination, and a tradition of social partnership (Darbishire 1997) . O ut comes for workers included relatively high and egalitarian wages, protection againstjob loss and erosion of working conditions, and substantial opportunities to participate in m anagem ent decision-making.
T hese in stitution s quickly unraveled following the privatization of DT and the introduction of com petition across m arket segments. While the DPG and now ver.di have sought to establish closer relationships with works councils in new firms, they face considerable obstacles, including lack of in terest or cooperation from new employers, com petition between unions, and low m em bership density in new industry segments. Today, collective bargaining in the Germ an telecom m unications industry occurs at the company level, even within the DT corporate group, while works councils have displaced unions as the primary, or only, form of col lective representation at DT's competitors. Meanwhile, m anagers are reorienting their investm ent strategies to increasingly pricecom petitive and differentiated m arkets, at the same time as they seek to balance obligations to their existing work force with increased pressures to maximize returns to shareholders.
The scope of these changes in markets and institutions makes the telecom m unications industry a particularly useful case for exam ining contem porary change in the Germ an industrial relations system. First, the findings provide evidence that a substantial transfor m ation in bargaining structures and union bargaining power is occurring in Germany, on a scale rem iniscent of U.S. developments in the 1980s (for example, Kochan et al. 1986) . Industrial relations in the G erm an telecommunications industry has undergone what Erickson andKuruvilla (1998) describe as a fundam ental or transformative change, measured in terms of both formal institutions and their system effects. Germ any's strong workplace-level co-determ ination institu tions have been viewed as interdependent with (or com plem entary to) industry-level bargaining structures, distinctive financial institutions providing "patien t cap ital," and quality-focused competitive strategies in international m arkets (Hall and Soskice 2001)-all of which have been weakened or are absent in this sector. In telecom m unica tions, the stability of industrial relations also relied on a high degree of m arket protection. Political decisions at the EU and national level to liberalize telecom m unications m arkets have increased pressures on firms to reduce costs, exacerbated by changing ownership patterns. These dynamics are not unique to telecommunications: many service industries in Germany, such as postal services, utilities, transportation and logistics, and hospitals, are currently undergoing sim ilar changes in m arkets and ow nership, affecting a large swath of traditionally protected workplaces (B randt et al. 2008; Keune et al. 2008) . Across these sectors, bargaining coverage and unions' capacity to coordinate bargain ing at sector level have declined, contribut ing to growing wage inequality (Bosch and W einkopf 2008) .
Second, the findings dem onstrate that organizational restructuring is a central ele m ent of firm strategy that is being used to drive institutional change in Germany. The case studies presented here show that new, m ore networked or vertically disintegrated organizational form s constitute an im por tant m echanism through which m anagers are able to pursue transformative change in em ploym ent systems. This represents what StreeckandThelen (2005:31) term "displace m ent" as employers defect from dom inant arrangem ents, leading to the "cultivation of a new 'logic' of action inside an existing institutional setting." Despite form al stabil ity in bargaining rights and some continuity in bargaining structures within core firms, unions and works councils are increasingly circumscribed in their ability to influence working conditions outside this core. Even at DT, the use of subcontractors and rene gotiation of contracts in subsidiaries have increased variation in em ploym ent systems across establishments and across different groups of employees in similar jobs. These trends are particularly pronounced in tele communications, due to its history of single employer bargaining and lack of a sectoral agreement. However, they are also consistent with the findings of recent studies in other sectors. Processes of vertical disintegration have weakened coordinated bargaining in the Germ an auto industry (Doellgast and Greer 2007; G reer 2008a; Jurgens et al. 2003) , health care sector (Greer 2008b) , and logistics (Plehwe 2001) . This suggests that the findings presented here may be repre sentative of broader trends in the Germ an economy, whereby the growing ambiguity of sectoral boundaries and growth of new non-union or weakly unionized sectors are making it increasingly difficult for industrybased unions to coordinate bargaining across complex supply networks.
Several core features of the traditional G erm an m odel have persisted in large telecom m unications firms-most notably, independent firm-and workplace-level co determ ination structures and "dual" voca tional training arrangem ents. U nion and works council influence looks particularly strong when com pared to m ore liberal coun tries such as the U nited States and Australia, where bargaining rights have traditionally been weaker and bargaining coverage has declined m ore dramatically over the past two decades (see the articles by Keefe and by Ross and Bamber in this issue). Germ an works councils' form al role in m anagem ent decision-making is unlikely to be contested in the near future, as m anagers rely on these bargaining structures to gain worker acceptance for, and cooperation with, new m easures that reorganize core jobs (Blutner et al. 2002) . Employers also rem ain largely com m itted to the apprenticeship training system, as apprentices are valued as a source of relatively low-cost labor and skills. How ever, this privileged core is shrinking as firms outsource work and reduce the skill content of certain jobs.
Together, these findings suggest that industrial relations institutions will play an increasingly circum scribed role in shaping m anagem ent strategy and worker outcomes in the Germ an telecommunications industry. Reversing these trends would require re-estab lishing coordinated bargaining, ideally across both large firms and their subcontractors. The degree to which bargaining coverage and coordination have declined in Germany is in some respects unique, and linked to dis tinctive traditions of Tarifautonomie, whereby employers and unions have broad rights to negotiate collective agreem ents without state intervention. Telecomm unications unions in other European countries with stronger state intervention in industrial relations have been m ore successful in establishing industry-wide bargaining structures. For example, in Belgium, France, and Finland, m andatory extension mechanisms require all firms in a sector to adhere to agreem ents negotiated by m ajor employers, leading to 100% bargaining coverage; and in Austria, m andatory m embership in employers associa tions plays a similar role (Traxler 2007:22) . Absent the developm ent of new mechanisms in Germany for extending m inim um terms of employment, com petition between locations for investm ent will continue to underm ine the coordinated bargaining institutions that have traditionally supported egalitarian pay structures and worker participation in restructuring decisions.
